Introduction
This article moves between the fields of reported self-experience of persons who are on the Autism spectrum, moral psychology and moral philosophy. We will use insights and ideas from Kantian discussions as well as from Ethics of care. It is clearly not the intention to contribute to a deep exegesis of Immanuel Kant's works, neither to enter the Neokantian debate. Neither is our aim to bring forward the highly interesting developments in care ethics, or the combinations of both in terms of relational autonomy and moral community. We intend to analyze critically some observations that are made from a moral psychological background on behalf of persons who are on the Autism spectrum. We hope to show by this example how crucial a mutual inspiration and information between the empirical and the conceptual side is for insights in ethics and moral education.
In most societies, human beings learn that it is not a good thing to lie and cheat or to engage in other deceptive behaviors. It is encountered with disapproval if they show signs of having become too good at that. As it is generally considered a good thing to develop a person's social and moral capabilities, the development of these 'Machiavellian' capabilities (Gavrilets 2006 ) appears undesirable. Paradoxically, the capacity for deception is most valuable and useful in a society where honesty and non-deception is the rule. If everybody was lying, lying -as well as truth telling -would be pointless.
Lying is not a common phenomenon amongst persons who are on the Autism Spectrum. They are less interested in deception (Baron-Cohen 2008, p. 72 ). Yet, everyday lies are considered to be of the utmost importance to live a healthy 1 life in relationship with others (Nyberg 1993, p. 2) . Therefore we will focus in this paper on the question:
Is it morally good to teach children and adolescents with Autism the social skill of lying?
Two rather different ethical starting points: a rational Kantian and an empathic 'ethics of care' perspective lead to opposing answers to our question. In this paper we will try to give reasons for preferring one ethical approach over the other.
Firstly, we will briefly explain what Autism is. Secondly, we will summarize psychological explanations for the autistic 'inability' to lie or the autistic tendency to be truthful. Thirdly, we will describe some experiences of lying and being honest written down in autobiographies of persons with Autism. Fourthly, we will discuss the alleged lack of empathy of persons with Autism and its relationship to their (dis)ability to lie. Fifthly, we will talk about a Kantian perspective on lying and being truthful and we will compare it with the autistic 'inability' to lie. Sixthly, an ethics of care perspective on lying and being truthful will be discussed in relation to moral agents with Autism. Finally, we will end with some concluding remarks and present the answer to our question.
What is Autism?
Whenever we speak of persons with Autism in this paper, we mean high-functioning persons with Autism. These are non-intellectually disabled persons on the Autism spectrum. It is by no means our intention to exclude intellectually disabled persons with Autism from these 1 We understand 'health' holistically, as the ability to reach vital goals under reasonable circumstances (Nordenfelt, 1987) .
matters and to disregard their interests. However, in order not to make things needlessly complicated we limit ourselves to high-functioning persons with Autism.
The primary diagnostic abnormalities in Autism spectrum disorder are:
qualitative impairment in social interaction, qualitative impairments in communication, and restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities 2 . Sensory difficulties are also quite common (Lawson 2009 ). Autism spectrum disorder has Asperger's disorder at the mild end, and severe autistic disorder at the other end (Wing 1997 Psychological explanations for the autistic 'inability' to lie or the autistic tendency to be truthful "Chimpanzees are known to be able to engage in deception, which is one of the many points in which they resemble modern humans. Individuals who have an Autistic Spectrum Disorder, on the other hand, tend to be much more honest than "normal" humans; it is very difficult for us to deceive, lie or cheat, and some never learn this "social skill."
Lying is a common phenomenon amongst human beings, yet not amongst persons with what you say (Fallis 2010, p.19) . In psychological literature lying is viewed as an everyday social interaction process and even as a social skill (DePaulo 1996) . People often tell everyday lies for emotional or psychological reasons: to try to make themselves look better or feel better, to protect themselves from embarrassment or disapproval or from having their feelings hurt, and to try to gain the esteem and affection of other people, or simply for the sake of convenience.
It has been acknowledged that cheating is not part of the autistic personality.
Jeanette Kennett has called this 'a kind of attractive moral innocence ' (Kennett 2002, p. 349) .
In neurotypical early childhood, the capability of lying and deceiving is formed. The instrument needed for this is called 'cognitive empathy', which is mental perspective taking or 'mentalizing' (Smith 2006, p. 3).
Simon Baron-Cohen, an influential psychologist specialized in Autism, claims that children with Autism, in comparison with normal children, seem less able to deceive, because they are unaware of the fact that other people's beliefs can be different from theirs (Baron-Cohen 1999, p. 181) . They lack the ability to empathize with others, to understand intentions, emotions and beliefs of other persons. In a sense, they are unable to form 'theory' about other persons' minds. They have a 'Theory of Mind' 3 deficit according to Baron-Cohen.
The development of 'Theory of Mind' in persons with Autism is a matter of gradation.
Autism exists on a continuum: less severely affected have more intact theory-of-mind skills.
High-functioning adults with Autism may be able to pass first-order 'Theory of Mind' tasks (like the Sally-Anne test), but still they perform significantly worse than nonautistic participants in advanced Theory of Mind tasks (Kleinman 2001) . The consequence of the 'Theory of Mind' deficit is that higher functioning persons with Autism may be able to form interpersonal relationships but only on their own terms (Barnbaum 2007, p. 26) . proponents (Kuhn 1977, p. 41ff) . It seems that Baron-Cohen overlooks this difference between pattern seeking and thereby casts the autistic brain as more 'scientific' than is warranted.
Baron
Lying and truth telling is not only about whether or not facts are being stated; it is also about performing actions, to bring about certain wanted states of affairs or to prevent certain unwanted states of affairs of taking place. 
Experiences of lying and being honest described in autobiographies of persons with Autism
By way of illustration some experiences of lying and being honest described in autobiographies of persons with Autism 6 will now be given. Temple Grandin, an autobiographer with Autism, writes: "Even though honesty is the best policy, my opinion about other people's appearance was usually not welcome […] . Through many specific examples, I developed a category of "rude honesty" when I needed to keep my mouth shut
Caiseal Mor, another autobiographer with Autism, writes: "Then I began saying things that offended people. I said what was on my mind. I didn't hold back. I was impolite. I was brutally honest. I was rude."
It seems that these autobiographers with Autism learned it 'the hard way' that being honest is not always appreciated in human relationships. Had they been neurotypical, 6 It is not our intention to generalize and hypothesize from a sampling of autobiographies of persons with Autism. The problem with autobiographies in general is that people usually want to paint a good picture of themselves. An additional problem with autobiographies of persons with Autism is the uncertainty over the quantity and quality of editing a manuscript has undergone. Nevertheless and having these reservations in mind, there is no better way to get insight into the inner world of another person than his or her self-reports.
this insight would probably have come to them more 'naturally' and much sooner. (Schneider 1999, p 106) .
What are the reasons the autobiographical authors with Autism give for their above average reluctance to lie? It seems this is so, because of the very intense emotions they experience, when they actually lie. Jeanette Purkis describes it as a very physical or bodily emotion, 'I wanted with every inch of my being to tell the truth' (Purkis 2006, p. 168) .
Temple Grandin describes emotions of intense fear: 'I become extremely anxious when I have to tell a little white lie' and 'Lying is very anxiety-provoking because it requires rapid interpretations of subtle social cues to determine whether the other person is really being deceived' (Grandin 2006, p. 156) . Jen Birch also uses bodily terms in the description of her emotion: 'I found such lies very painful and unpalatable' and 'I still feel 'yucky' about the few times when I was maneuvered into saying that I was something that I am not' (Birch (2003 p. 121) . This last author clearly articulates her feeling of moral repugnance against lying, which is an instance of 'moral intuition' with regard to lying (Hare 1981, p. 58).
Some persons with Autism learn to categorize situations and statements and by that way understand how to manage in an ordinary (not always truthful) environment. This categorization will give a lawful character to deception; it can be predicted when lying and deception may be allowed and when it is ruled out. Temple Grandin's classification of wrongdoing, her distinction between 'really bad', 'sins of the system', and 'illegal but not bad' serves this purpose. She writes:
"I constructed a decision-making program for whether rules could be broken by classifying wrongdoing into three categories: "really bad", "sins of the system", and "illegal but not bad". Rules classified as really bad must never be broken. Stealing, destroying property, and injuring other people are in this category, and they were easy to understand. The "illegal but not bad" rules can often be broken with little consequence. Examples would be slight speeding on the freeway and illegal parking. The "sins of the system" category covers rules that have very stiff penalties for seemingly illogical reasons". (Grandin 2006, p. 
108)
This approach can be seen as a cognitive way to overcoming the 'inability' to lie and deceive and hence make everyday life smoother. However, by no means do we suggest that this approach can be generalized to other persons with Autism. It should be regarded as just an individual answer to the problems with following rules an individual person with Autism experiences.
Persons with Autism, empathy and morality
It has already been stated that persons with Autism are deficient in the ability to empathize with others. Simply stating that persons with Autism lack empathy, however, is going too far.
We have to distinguish between cognitive empathy and emotional empathy. The former is 'the ability to understand and predict the behavior of others in terms of attributed mental states, particularly epistemic mental states such as believing, knowing, pretending, and guessing'.
The latter is 'an emotional response in an individual that stems from and parallels the emotional state of another individual' (Smith 2009, p. 490 (Nussbaum 2004, p. 183 ).
The deficit in cognitive empathy of persons with Autism is a problem when persons with Autism should want to engage in an ethics of care perspective. But they may be able to make up for that deficiency in a more cognitive or a more rational way. There appears to be no problem for persons with Autism when they should want to engage in a Kantian perspective. Kant's rigorist convictions on the subject of lying, e.g., are strikingly mirroring the attitude of persons with Autism towards lying. However, this is only a superficial resemblance and more needs to be said about the differences between Kantian thinking with regard to truth telling and autistic thinking. To this we turn now. (Guseinov 2010, p.33 ).
In our society, the morals in practice seem to be less demanding than the Kantian 'moral law'. Therefore we can see a tension between the moral practices of everyday life and the moral principles about deception (Nyberg 1993, p. 65) . 11 On the other hand, the breakdown of trust is fairly easily reached in personal relations after telling a lie, at least if it regards something important. It would seem that a requirement of truthfulness about important matters is necessary to lay the foundation of our personal relation to other people. the contrary, the right impulse would be to act rightly for the moral law's sake, emotionless.
13
Not because one wants to do something good, and because one feels bad if one does not do it.
The persons with Autism, however, seem to be very sensitive for inconsistencies in the system, though in an intuitive way. Every single particular truth seems to be equally important. Persons with Autism cannot disregard a particular truth for the 'truth' of the whole, like neurotypicals, contrary to Kant, sometimes do. Persons with Autism do not need the 12 It does matter, however, which understanding of truth-telling, lying and deception is addressed. If one understands lying as interfering with another person's autonomy (Korsgaard 1996, 347) , or as the failure of symmetric creation of a common moral horizon (Shapiro 2006, 50-51) , truth-telling is no longer the report of one's own perspective on facts, but a complex interpersonal interaction. This is however obviously not the way persons with Autism use the term "lying" and "truth-telling" in self-reports, but more directly as intentional falsehood telling. 13 "To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and there are souls so sympathetically attuned (…). But I assert that in such a case the action (…) has no true moral worth (…); for the maxim lacks moral contents, namely the action not from inclination but from duty. " (Kant 2002, p. 14/ Ak 4, p. 398).
categorical imperative as a law; they live it 14 . From a Kantian perspective, this is not the moral ideal. It would be, if they had chosen this orientation themselves, without emotions, even more praiseworthy if done against emotions. Nevertheless, if a person with Autism should receive moral training from a Kantian, it would be a cognitive training. What he or she had to learn is replacing the intuitive background with a purely cognitive one -not feeling bad about lying and about the reactions of others who demand more context-sensitivity and politeness, but defending his or her position in a rational way, and demanding the same uncompromising truthfulness of all others.
An ethics of care perspective on lying and being truthful
In reaction to Kantian ways of thinking, the ethics of care criticizes moral thinking in terms of rules, laws and duties, and introduces the importance of good caring relationships between human beings as an essential feature of morality. Care as an orientation or as a perspective is directed at living good in concrete relationships with others, responding empathically to their needs and building up a joint life (Verkerk 2001, p. 290) . Persons with Autism are by nature not very competent in building relationships. The care ethicist Michael Slote bases caring in empathy (Slote 2007, p. 10) . Because persons with Autism are weak empathizers and weak relationship builders, the ethics of care perspective is difficult to access for persons with Autism.
This is problematic for the usability of an ethics of care perspective. Persons with Autism are generally moral agents belonging to the moral community and they are able to understand, apply, and act on moral reasons (Shoemaker 2007, p. 95 ). Yet, by emphasizing empathy and relationships, the ethics of care perspective appears to exclude a substantial subset of moral agents from making use of this particular perspective. The ethics of care perspective will make little sense to moral agents with Autism. The difficulties become apparent in the ability or disability to tell everyday lies and to tell justifiable lies.
It is clear that from a prudential point of view it is not good to have an autistic 'inability' to lie. Small everyday lies seem to be a necessary means to reach the goal of a healthy lifetime of relationships with others. Therefore, the autistic predisposition to be truthful or the autistic 'inability' to lie is an obstacle for living the good life, at least for them.
On the other hand, there is also a vital question about the value of truth and truthfulness to sustaining relationships. However, for the sake of brevity we will not deepen this question
here but we will simply state the observation that in healthy relationships there needs to be a healthy balance between being truthful and being deceptive.
The ethics of care perspective seems to suggest that the autistic predisposition to be truthful or the autistic 'inability' to lie can also be an obstacle for living the good life for others. The radical 'inability' to lie and deceive can be an obstacle for acting morally. That can be illustrated by the Kantian example of a murderer who comes to your home to ask you whether or not his intended victim hides in your house might clarify this. You need 'Theory of Mind' to be able to guess the intention behind this question. It would be 'careless', in a literal sense, to speak the truth to this person. So it would seem that the stronger emotions of persons with Autism against lying in such extreme, but nevertheless realistically imaginable, situations are more a burden than an asset.
Starting from an ethics of care perspective, a neurotypical moral agent can context-and relationship-sensitively, come to a conclusion about when it is wrong, but also when it is good to lie. However, a moral agent with Autism would have a hard time assessing such a moral situation when he or she starts from an ethics of care perspective, given his or her deficit in cognitive empathy and his or her lack of practical knowledge in the dynamics of relationships. Unless ethics of care theorists do not recognize persons with Autism to be moral agents, because of this cognitive empathy deficit, they will have to take into account in their theorizing the natural limitations of autistic moral agents in order not to be discriminating.
Why persons with Autism should learn the social skill of (some) deception
When we look at the relationships between neurotypical and persons with Autism we see that it is important that neurotypical persons become aware of the fact that persons with Autism tend to cling to truthfulness. This means that neurotypical persons cannot expect them to lie, We acknowledge that there is a problem if one does not immediately recognize a person as having Autism; a neurotypical can be rather upset by a 'rude' remark from such a person, which would have been excused if the information on Autism had been available.
Should persons with Autism inform about their condition to avoid such problems? This question, although interesting, is outside the scope of this paper.
On the other hand, because persons with Autism are regarded as moral agents, they appear to have a moral responsibility, just as neurotypical persons, to sometimes refrain from making truthful statements or to sometimes even make untruthful statements. However, they can only be held responsible to the extent of their capabilities with regard to truth telling or telling lies. We should be careful not to confuse an autistic disability with a moral deficiency.
For the moral development of neurotypical persons and persons with Autism alike, it does not seem useful to prefer the Kantian project. One of the most important tasks is to develop context-sensitivity and responsibility with regard to uttering true statements. As
Temple Grandin has shown impressively with her own rule system, it is perfectly possible to use individual strengths of creating rules and patterns for this purpose.
Can we find a common ground for neurotypicals, who are often too good at lying, and persons with Autism, who have great difficulties in telling even a small lie? We think that persons with Autism need to be trained in lying and deception in order to live healthier lives in relationship with others, in the same way that neurotypical children need to learn not to lie too much. The 'training in lying and deception' must be focused on contextsensitivity, that is, on a cognitive explanation under which circumstances it is advisable to lie.
This could also empower the person with Autism for situations where lying is morally necessary e.g. to protect the lives, health and well-being of innocent others. The rules that Temple Grandin has created for herself in order to distinguish situations which account for an exception of rules and principles, can serve as an example. However, whether such training will increase health and well-being for the persons with Autism themselves is a matter of empirical research. Training in deception that leads to a decrease in health and well-being of the participants with Autism is already for this reason immoral. So, after an examination of classical Kantianism and care ethics we come to the following conclusion: Unless such an
